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WHAT DID PUNITIVE DAMAGES DO? WHY




Punitive damages occupy a unique place in Anglo-American law.
They require juries to measure damages based on the defendant's
attitude when he injured the plaintiff, and they allow juries tremen-
dous discretion in doing so. Most recent debate over punitive dam-
ages has focused on the frequency and scale of damages awarded by
juries.' Some have questioned whether juries are capable of following
the instructions that they receive.2 The more basic question-what
are the purposes or rationales for punitive damages-has not played
as great a role as one might think. This is because, as commentators
have pointed out, punitive damages are explained by courts and
commentators as having a variety of plausible purposes, some mutu-
ally complementary and some mutually exclusive.'
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I would like to thank Ningur Akoglu, BLS
'04 and Vijay Baliga, BLS '04, for their invaluable research assistance, as well as John Goldberg,
Catherine Sharkey, and Lisa White for their comments and suggestions. This Article was
written with the support of a Summer Research Grant from Brooklyn Law School.
1. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An
Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2002); Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of
Justice Through National Punitive Damages Reform, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1573 (1997); Dan
Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559 (1992); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in
Punitive Damages "Run Wild": Proposals for Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L.
REV. 1003 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition
and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998).
2. See, e.g., Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's
Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901 (1998); David A. Schkade et al.,
Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000), W. Kip
Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (2001).
3. A typical commentary on modem punitive damages doctrine points out that
[a]lthough most courts refer only to "punishment" and "deterrence" as rationales for
[punitive] damages, this masks the variety of specific functions that punitive damages
actually serve. The functions of punitive damages can be divided and subdivided in
any number of overlapping ways, but the following division should prove useful for the
particular points examined here: (1) education, (2) retribution, (3) deterrence, (4)
compensation, and (5) law enforcement.
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It is worth taking note, therefore, when the United States Su-
preme Court actually bases a decision on the grounds that, of the
many possible functions of punitive damages, one is more salient than
another. That is what the Court did in Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.4 In Cooper, the Court used a claim
about the contrast between the historical and contemporary functions
of punitive damages to justify its conclusion that jury awards of
punitive damages today are punishment, not compensation.5 In turn,
the Court used this historical contrast to conclude that jury determi-
nations of punitive damages are not today "findings of facts," al-
though, presumably, they once were.6 The Court therefore concluded
that punitive damage verdicts by juries were not within the Seventh
Amendment's Reexamination Clause and, as matters of law, ought to
be reviewed on appeal under a de novo standard.7
In this Article I will not take issue with the wisdom of the Court's
holding. I will instead criticize the historical and functional argu-
ments used by the Court to reach its holding. In Part I, I will examine
the grounds offered by the Court for its holding in Cooper. I will
show that the Court justified its functional approach to the review of
punitive damages partly on the grounds that the function of punitive
damages has changed since the nineteenth century. In Part II, I will
show that early punitive damage awards did not compensate for
losses that today would be recognized as part of the blackletter
categories of compensatory damages, and so it would be at best
anachronistic (and at worst misleading) to say that punitive damages
served primarily a compensatory function in the early years of
American tort law, as the Court claimed in Cooper. In Part III, I will
show that punitive damages served a range of functions, including
vindication and redress for insult, which the Court's either/or choice
between compensation and punishment missed and cannot explain. I
David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L.
REV. 363, 373-74 (1994) (citations omitted). Another commentator suggests seven:
(1) punishing the defendant; (2) deterring the defendant from repeating the offense;(3) deterring others from committing an offense; (4) preserving the peace; (5) inducing
private law enforcement; (6) compensating victims for otherwise uncompensable
losses; and (7) paying the plaintiff's attorney's fees.
Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 3 (1982).
4. 121 S. Ct. 1678 (2001).
5. Id. at 1683, 1686 n.ll.
6. Id. at 1686.
7. Id. at 1685-86.
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conclude this Article by suggesting that Cooper was a step back for
those who wish to bring principled adjudication into modern punitive
damages.
The point of the Article is not to chide the Court for making a
mistake about legal history. As will become apparent as the argu-
ment unfolds, the real story of what punitive damages were supposed
to do in the nineteenth century is complex and rich with possibilities
that could inform contemporary analysis. The crude revisionist
model imposed by the Court not only weakens its argument that
juries exercise moral judgment when determining punitive damages,
it makes it harder to explain what the content of that moral judgment
is, and how it should be presented to juries. In fact, as I suggest in my
conclusion, the Court's historical errors will probably have the
unintended consequence of strengthening the already popular views
that punitive damages are simply one way that society deters bad
conduct and that punitive damage awards should be calculated
according to the logic of efficient deterrence.
I. COOPER V. LEA THERMAN AND THE HISTORICAL FUNCTION OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The Cooper case involved a suit by a tool manufacturer against
another manufacturer.8 The defendant marketed a tool very similar
to one already marketed by the plaintiff.9 The plaintiff sued for
trademark infringement, arguing, among other things, that the
defendant had gone so far as to have photographed the plaintiff's
product and used that photograph in promotional material advertis-
ing the defendant's own product. 0 A jury found for the plaintiff and
awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages and $4.5 million in
punitive damages." The district court rejected the defendant's
argument that the punitive damages were grossly excessive in viola-
tion of due process under the United States Constitution.12  On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the award of punitive damages based on the conclusion that
the district court had not abused its discretion in declining to reduce
8. Id. at 1680.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1681.
11. Id.
12. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 1997 US Dist LEXIS 22763 at *9
(D. Or. Nov. 14, 1997).
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the award.13 The Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice
Stevens, reversed the Ninth Circuit. 14
The constitutional question raised in Cooper was under what
standard the Ninth Circuit should have reviewed the trial court's
judgment concerning the constitutionality of the jury's award of
punitive damages. 5 There were two choices available to the Ninth
Circuit. Under the de novo standard, the appellate judges look
directly at the trial record and test the jury's award against their own
best understanding of the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under the abuse of discretion standard, the appellate judges examine
the trial judge's review of the jury verdict and overturn the trial
judge's judgment only if the trial judge's application of the Four-
teenth Amendment was clearly erroneous.
In order to answer this question, the Court argued that de novo
review is required because the test for whether a jury award violates
the Fourteenth Amendment is like the test used in other cases in
which the federal appellate courts review the application of punish-
ment by the states. 16 On the other hand, the Court rejected the
argument that the Seventh Amendment required abuse of discretion
review. 7 The Court noted that, although the Seventh Amendment's
Reexamination Clause had been interpreted by the Court, in earlier
decisions, to direct the appellate courts to review trial court judg-
ments concerning jury awards under an abuse of discretion standard,
the Seventh Amendment did not apply to punitive damage awards,
since punitive damage awards were not findings of fact "found" by a
jury. 18
In Cooper, therefore, there are two arguments, one positive and
one negative. On the positive side, the Court made a case for why
punitive damage verdicts should be reviewed under a de novo stan-
dard. On the negative side, the Court made a case for why punitive
damages should not be reviewed under the abuse of discretion
standard. The positive argument turned on drawing a comparison
between punitive damages and criminal and civil penalties, and the
negative argument turned on emphasizing the disanalogy between
13. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 205 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1999).
14. Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1683.
15. Id. at 1682.
16. Id. at 1683.
17. Id. at 1684, 1686.
18. Id. at 1686-87.
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punitive damages and "facts." The two arguments were not explicitly
connected; but, as I will show, both depended on characterizing the
determination of the size of punitive damages as a moral judgment.
The Court's assumption was that where state law requires juries to
make moral judgments, the Seventh Amendment no longer applies,
and the Fourteenth Amendment requires de novo review.
A. The Positive Argument: Punitive Damages Awards Are Value
Judgments
The first part of the Court's argument began with the following
claim: "A jury's assessment of the extent of a plaintiff's injury is
essentially a factual determination, whereas its imposition of punitive
damages is an expression of its moral condemnation."19 The Court
argued that, because punitive damage awards reflect moral judg-
ments, they are like criminal punishments set by legislatures. 20 Of
course in 1989, the Court held in Browning-Ferris that punitive
damage awards were not criminal penalties and therefore could not
be reviewed under the Eighth Amendment.21 However, both punitive
damage awards and criminal penalties share something in common:
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the
context of criminal law, the Eighth Amendment is imposed against
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause;
and in the context of tort law, the Due Process Clause is applied
directly to the states.
The Due Process Clause, said the Court, constrains the states in
criminal law and tort law in related ways. In criminal law the states
are prohibited from imposing excessive fines and cruel and unusual
punishment, and in tort law they are prohibited "from imposing
'grossly excessive' punishments on tortfeasors."22 A punitive damage
award is grossly excessive when it bears no reasonable relationship to
the compensatory damage that underwrites it.23 Penalties that bear
no reasonable relationship to underlying compensatory damages
violate due process, the court explained in Gore, because they (by
definition) cannot be anticipated in advance, and hence violate the
19. Id. at 1683.
20. Id. at 1683-86.
21. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279 (1989).
22. Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1684 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562
(1996)).
23. Id. at 1691.
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basic principle that no one should be punished without prior notice of
the penalty.24
The Court suggested in Cooper that where it has struck down an
entire class of punishment it is because it was "grossly excessive" in
the same way that a tort penalty could be "grossly excessive. ' '21 For
example, in cases involving the death penalty, life imprisonment, or
forfeiture, the Court has used "the same general criteria" that it
adopted in Gore.26 Those criteria are: (1) the degree of the defen-
dant's reprehensibility or culpability; (2) the relationship between the
penalty and the harm to the victim caused by the defendant's actions;
and (3) the sanctions imposed in other cases for comparable miscon-
duct.27
The Court summarized the three-part test for excessiveness un-
der the following rubric: a penalty violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment if it is "'grossly disproportional to the
gravity of... defendants' offenses.' ' 28 Let us call this the "grossly
disproportionate" standard (the "GD Standard"). The Court may be
correct that this norm regulates the limits of the states' power to
punish, both in criminal law and tort law. This does not explain why,
however, an appellate court should review a trial court's application
of the GD Standard de novo.
At one level, it is strange that one even has to pose the question.
One might simply argue that if the application of the GD Standard is
an interpretation of the Constitution, the judge who performs the task
of interpretation is obliged to interpret the Constitution, and not
defer to another judge's interpretation. But such an argument has
never been the view of the Supreme Court and the Court did not
invoke it in Cooper. Instead, the Court made an argument about
24. Gore, 517 U.S. at 562, 574-75.
25. Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1684.
26. Id. at 1684 (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998) ($357,144
penalty excessive for reporting violation); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (life
imprisonment excessive for nonviolent felony); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,787,801 (1982)
(death penalty excessive for robbery leading to murder); Colker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977) (death penalty excessive for rape) and comparing these cases to Gore).
27. Gore, 517 U.S., 575-85
28. Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1684 (quoting Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334). This explains why, for
example, the court might hold that the death penalty is not excessive in the case of murder, or
why a punitive damage award of $5 billion is not excessive in the case of a tort resulting in a $2
billion loss.
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institutional competency that was both prudential and based some-
what in the legal process tradition.2 9
The Court began its justification of de novo review by observing
that the only issue at stake was the review of the trial court's determi-
nation that a tort-based punishment was not grossly excessive accord-
ing to the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 The Court's argument for de
novo review must be read against a background in which district court
judgments generally are treated under the abuse of discretion stan-
dard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Under Rule 59, the
district court may order a new trial or offer a remittitur.3t When
considering a Rule 59 motion challenging the compensatory or
punitive damages awarded by the jury, the court must decide whether
the award is against the weight of the evidence or excessive given
state law. A typical common law test for excessiveness in punitive
damages is that the award "shocks the judicial conscience" or is
unreasonable in light of the punitive and deterrent purposes of the
award. There might be other state statutory limits as well, although it
is not clear whether these would properly be raised under Rule 8,
Rule 59, or Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or
perhaps simply imposed by the court as part of its duty under Erie.32
29. The theory of "institutional competence" propounded by the Legal Process School held
that "there could be a kind of natural, functional correlation between different kinds of disputes
and different kinds of institutions, so that the categories of dispute could be matched up with
the kinds of institutional procedures corresponding to them." Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in
the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561, 594 (1988).
30. Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1685.
31. See Colleen P. Murphy, Judgment As A Matter of Law on Punitive Damages, 75 TUL.
L. REV. 459, 462-64 (2000).
32. This issue has arisen frequently with regard to the failure to plead statutory caps. See,
e.g., Taylor v. United States, 821 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1987) (statutory limitation on professional
negligence may be pled postverdict under Rules 59 and 60); Ingraham v. United States, 808 F.2d
1075 (5th Cir. 1987) (statutory limitation on professional negligence must be pled under Rule 8
or waived); Jakobsen v. Mass. Port Auth., 520 F.2d 810 (1st Cir. 1975) (statutory limitation on
Port Authority liability should have been pled as an affirmative defense). The Supreme Court
has not answered this question. See Taylor v. United States, 485 U.S. 992 (1988) (White, J.,
dissenting). The most recent treatment of the question anticipated the court's comments in
Cooper. In Westfarm Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commis-
sion, 66 F.3d 669 (4th Cir. 1995), the defendant, a municipality, moved under Rule 59 to limit its
liability under a state law capping municipal liability at $200,000. The district court held that
since it had not raised the cap under Rule 8 in anticipation of the judgment, it had waived the
limitation. The Fourth Circuit noted that:
The district court found that the cap is an affirmative defense, which therefore
must be raised, according to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c).... The district
court found that because the defense had not been raised or tried by the parties, it was
waived.
We review a district court's factual findings on a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of
discretion, Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990), but we review
the district court's legal holdings de novo, Taylor v. United States, 821 F.2d 1428, 1430
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In a case arising from a Rule 59 motion, the district court's judg-
ment will be reviewed by the appellate court under an abuse of
discretion standard. 3 Therefore, when a federal trial judge has to
determine whether a punitive damage award "shocks the judicial
conscience" under Rule 59, her judgment is reviewed by the appellate
court under a lower standard than when she has to determine
whether the same award is "grossly excessive" under the Due Process
Clause.34 The procedural basis for this disparate treatment of what
otherwise appears to be the same question is that "gross" excessive-
ness under the Fourteenth Amendment concerns the application of
federal constitutional law, and common law excessiveness is a matter
of state law.35
n.1 (9th Cir. 1987) (Taylor I), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 992, 108 S.Ct. 1300, 99 L. Ed. 2d
510 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Taylor II).
Westfarm, 66 F.3d at 689. The court, noting the split in the circuits, then determined that it need
not decide whether the limitation on liability should have been raised under Rule 8, because the
answer was nonoutcome determinative. Id. at 690.
These cases raise an interesting question: how ought a state (or federal) statutory cap or
ratio on punitive damages enter into a case? The court in Cooper seemed to assume that if the
defendant wished to take advantage of a cap or statute, she ought to raise it under Rule 59. See
Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1687 n.13. The answer has direct application to the due process issue, since
one could argue that the Due Process Clause imposes an "upper cap" on the range of punitive
damages that a jury may award, much like a statutory cap. See, e.g., Brief for the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America, 1999 Lexsee US Briefs 2035, *15-*16 ("the
excessiveness inquiry under Gore and comparable state-law standards is analogous to the
application of a statutory damages cap"). I thank Professor John Goldberg for pointing this
argument out to me.
33. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279. n.18
(1989):
The role of the district court is to determine whether the jury's verdict is within the
confines set by state law, and to determine, by reference to federal standards devel-
oped under Rule 59, whether a new trial or remittitur should be ordered. The court of
appeals should then review the district court's determination under an abuse-of-
discretion standard.
Cooper is in accord. See Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1684.
34. Furthermore, even when confining itself to a case arising under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the court noted that the appellate court was obliged to defer to a trial judge on
matters of fact. Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1685.
35. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 438 n.22 (1996):
It is indeed "Hornbook" law that a most usual ground for a Rule 59 motion is that "the
damages are excessive." See C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 676-677 (5th ed. 1994).
Whether damages are excessive for the claim-in-suit must be governed by some law.
And there is no candidate for that governance other than the law that gives rise to the
claim for relief-here, the law of New York. See ... Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S., at 279
("standard of excessiveness" is a "matte[r] of state, and not federal, common law").
Since Cooper was handed down, a majority of states courts have used the de novo standard
to review a trial court's review of the constitutionality of an award of punitive damages and the
abuse of discretion standard to review the trial court's review of a punitive damage award under
the state's common law excessiveness standard. See Cent. Bering Sea Fisherman's Ass'n. v.
Anderson, 54 P.3d 271, 277 (Alaska 2002); Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 165
(Ca. Ct. App. 2002); Time Warner Entm't Co. v. Six Flags Over Ga., 563 S.E.2d 178, 183 (Ga.
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But what rationale is there for the difference? The Court's ex-
planation did not directly address that gap.3 6 Instead, it focused on
the unique features of a constitutional norm like the GD Standard.
What are those features? The Court noted that the question of
whether a punishment is proportionate is like the question of whether
a police officer had reasonable suspicion or probable cause.37 In both
cases, the norm cannot be articulated except through application to
the facts of the case. There are three reasons for this. First, gross
excess in punishment is a "'fluid concept that takes [its] substantive
content"' from the context in which it is being assessed.38 Second, a
standard like gross excess takes its "content" not only from context
but "'only through application."' 39 Third, de novo review of such a
constitutional standard "'tends to unify precedent and stabilize the
law." ' 4° This argument takes one of the primary practical features of
the GD Standard-that in order for a punishment to be fair, it must
be comparable to other punishments awarded for similar wrongs, and
that comparability must be knowable in advance -and marries it to a
claim of comparative institutional competency-that the appellate
courts are in the best position to engage in broad comparisons across
the federal system. It roots the argument for de novo review of
judgments about the Due Process Clause in pragmatic concerns.
But there is still a nagging question: if the right way to apply the
GD Standard to jury verdicts is de novo review (for the reasons
described in the previous paragraph), why not insist on de novo
review when appellate courts review district court judgments under
Rule 59? Everything that the Court argued concerning the pragmatic
advantages of de novo review when inquiring into the gross excess of
a penalty could be argued about the inquiry into whether a penalty is
so excessive that it shocks the judicial conscience. As Justice Gins-
burg put it in her dissent, the Court's opinion now "requires lower
Ct. App. 2002); Stroud v. Lints, 760 N.E.2d 1176, 1180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Mosing v. Domas,
830 So. 2d 967, 970 (La. 2002); Baker v. Nat'l State Bank, 801 A.2d 1158, 1162-63 (N.J. Super
Ct. App. Div. 2002); Leisinger v. Jacobson, 651 N.w.2d 693, 696 n.2 (S.D. 2002). But see
Diversified Holdings L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129 1 4 (holding that de novo review should be
used for review under federal and state standards).
36. The Court states simply that "[i]f no constitutional issue is raised, the role of the
appellate court, at least in the federal system, is merely to review the trial court's 'determination
under an abuse-of-discretion standard."' Cooper, 121 S. Ct. 1684.
37. Id. at 1685 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996)).
38. Id. (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696).
39. Id. (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697).
40. Id. (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697-98).
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courts to distinguish between ordinary common law excessiveness and
constitutional excessiveness." 41  The point is not that the Court's
argument for de novo review is unpersuasive, given the premise that
punitive damages are punishment. The point is that it proves too
much: if de novo review is such a good idea, why isn't it required for
all federal appellate review of the excessiveness of punitive dam-
ages? 42
There is no way to answer this question without bringing in the
Seventh Amendment, which is the missing piece in the Cooper story.
The question of whether a punitive damage award is excessive under
state law is a question of fact, and the Seventh Amendment severely
restricts a reexamination of any finding of fact by the federal courts. 43
In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,44 the Court held that
appellate review of a federal trial court's refusal to set aside a jury
verdict as excessive is reconcilable with the Seventh Amendment if
"appellate control [is] limited to review for 'abuse of discretion."'
Cooper was not supposed to modify Gasperini, which placed all Rule
59 review under the protection of the Seventh Amendment:
We agree with the Second Circuit, however, that "[flor purposes of
deciding whether state or federal law is applicable [under the Sev-
enth Amendment], the question whether an award of compensatory
damages exceeds what is permitted by law is not materially differ-
41. Id. at 1693.
42. In this context it is useful to recall Justice Kennedy's early plea for uniform standards if
the Supreme Court was to engage in substantive due process review of punitive damages:
To ask whether a particular award of punitive damages is grossly excessive begs the
question: excessive in relation to what? The answer excessive in relation to the con-
duct of the tortfeasor may be correct, but it is unhelpful, for we are still bereft of any
standard by which to compare the punishment to the malefaction that gave rise to it.
A reviewing court employing this formulation comes close to relying upon nothing
more than its own subjective reaction to a particular punitive damages award in decid-
ing whether the award violates the Constitution. This type of review, far from impos-
ing meaningful, law-like restraints on jury excess, could become as fickle as the process
it is designed to superintend.
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 466-67 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The problem is, what Justice Kennedy argues about due process is, in theory, no less true about
remittitur.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.").
44. 518 U.S. 415,419 (1996); see also Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208,211-12
(1998) (per curiam) (Court reaffirming that the Seventh Amendment does not permit the
outright reduction of an excessive jury award (citing Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 433)).
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ent from the question whether an award of punitive damages ex-
ceeds what is permitted by law. '45
The short answer as to why excessiveness under state law cannot be
treated like excessiveness under the Constitution is not that the
standards might be different (they may not be) or that de novo review
of Rule 59 judgments might not benefit from "interpretation through
application" (it might). The reason is that the Seventh Amendment
will not permit it.
The Court recognized that, until its decision in Cooper, many ob-
servers thought that the Seventh Amendment applied to cases like
Haslip and Gore and that federal trial courts were engaged in the
same sort of project when they reviewed punitive damages under
Rule 59 and then the Fourteenth Amendment. In Cooper the Court
set the record straight:
Because the jury's award of punitive damages does not constitute a
finding of "fact," appellate review of the District Court's determi-
nation that an award is consistent with due process does not impli-
cate the Seventh Amendment concerns raised by respondent....
Our decisions in Gasperini and Hetzel, both of which concerned
compensatory damages, are not to the contrary. 46
It is true that both Gasperini and Hetzel raised questions about
the excessiveness of compensatory damages under Rule 59 only. So it
remained a logical possibility that, if punitive damage awards were
not facts when viewed from the perspective of due process, and the
Seventh Amendment requires that appellate courts use an abuse of
discretion test when they review district court judgments relating to
facts, then appellate review of whether a punitive damage award
violates the Fourteenth Amendment would not be governed by the
Seventh Amendment. The Court seized this logical possibility, and
thereby provided an answer to critics (such as Justice Ginsberg in
dissent) who would otherwise have demanded an explanation as to
why the Court had, until now, treated punitive damages very differ-
ently from criminal punishment imposed by the state.47  But, of
45. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 435 (alteration in original) (quoting Consorti v. Armstrong
World Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003, 1012 (2d Cir. 1995)).
46. Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1686.
47. And what about appellate review of whether a punitive damage award is excessive
under state law? The Court did not answer this question (it was not before it), but hinted at a
solution: if the state treats the question of excessiveness as a matter of fact-as indicated,
perhaps, by its adoption of the term "remittitur" -then the federal court should treat the
punitive damage award as a factual finding for purposes of Rule 59. I admit that this is a
speculative claim. It is based on note 10 of the majority opinion:
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course, to make this argument stick, the Court had to explicitly
state-and justify-the somewhat novel view that when juries as-
sessed punitive damages, they were not engaged in fact-finding.
B. The Negative Argument: Punitive Damage Calculations by Juries
Are Not "Seventh Amendment" Facts.
The positive component of the Court's argument was that puni-
tive damages are punishment imposed by the state, and, as punish-
ment imposed by the state, ought to be treated like other state-
imposed punishment in questions of due process under the Four-
teenth Amendment. The argument for this was partially one of
family resemblance (both criminal penalties and tort penalties are
tested under the GD Standard) and one of pragmatism (the GD
Standard works best when appellate courts review trial court applica-
tions of it de novo). The negative component of the Court's argu-
ment was that punitive damage awards are not findings of fact. That
argument was raised in order to disable the Seventh Amendment
argument.
The first component of the Court's argument posited that puni-
tive damages are more similar to penalties in criminal law than tort
awards, which are based on "concrete" fact.4 The second component
posited that punitive damages judgments are more similar to findings
of law than findings of fact.49 The decision as a whole relied on two
contrasts: (1) factual loss vs. punishment and (2) findings of fact vs.
legal findings. Placed alongside one another, it is obvious that the
idea of a "fact" is doing different sorts of work in each contrast. In the
former, damages based on "fact" are awarded in order to replace the
things the private litigant has lost, and damages that "punish" are
Respondent argues that our decision in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg... rests upon the
assumption that punitive damages awards are findings of fact. In that case, we held
that the Oregon Constitution, which prohibits the reexamination of any "fact tried by a
jury,".., violated due process because it did not allow for any review of the constitu-
tionality of punitive damages awards. Respondent claims that, because we considered
this provision of the Oregon Constitution to cover punitive damages, we implicitly held
that punitive damages are a "fact tried by a jury".... It was the Oregon Supreme
Court's interpretation of that provision, however, and not our own, that compelled the
treatment of punitive damages as covered.
Id. at 1686 n.10 (citations omitted).
48. Id. at 1683. What is a concrete fact? A fact "'which presents a question of historical or
predictive fact, see, e.g., [St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 35 S.Ct. 704, 59 L.Ed.
1160 (1915)], the level of punitive damages is not really a 'fact' 'tried' by the jury."' Cooper, 121
S. Ct. at 1686 (quoting Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 459 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
49. Id. at 1683-84.
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awarded to promote public policy. In the latter, conclusions that are
within a layperson's competency are deemed factual while conclu-
sions requiring the skills of the court are deemed legal.
The Court seemed to be assuming that there is a common ele-
ment in the factual nature of private redress and the special range of
jury decisionmaking protected under the Seventh Amendment. What
is the common element? It seems that the Court's answer is that, like
the calculation of compensation, the determination of a fact by a jury
does not employ moral concepts or reasoning. As the Court said in
setting out the first contrast, "a jury's assessment of the extent of a
plaintiff's injury is essentially a factual determination, whereas its
imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its moral condem-
nation."5 0 Later, when pressed to explain why, despite the fact that
they are awarded by juries, punitive damages are not facts found by
juries, the court again invoked morality as the contrast to fact.51 In
fact, the Court's insistence on drawing as sharp a distinction between
jury fact-finding and jury moralizing was so strong that it downplayed
the vast (and widely accepted) literature that stresses punitive dam-
ages' deterrent function, 52 since even admitting that juries might be
trying to base their awards on factual determinations such as the costs
and benefits of defendants' wrongdoing would bring their decision-
making too close to the Seventh Amendment. Instead, the Court
made a passing reference to various theories of punishment that are
not deterrence-based. 3
To be clear, let me stress that the purpose of this section is not to
criticize the Court's holding. I am very attracted to the idea that
punitive damages are primarily about moral judgment. And it seems
to me for a variety of reasons that appellate review of trial court
judgments pertaining to the constitutionality of a jury's punitive
damages award ought to be de novo. The purpose of this section is to
criticize the reasoning used by the Court that brought it to its salutary
50. Id. at 1683 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)).
51. Id. at 1686-87.
52. "Deterrence is probably the most universal rationale [of punitive damages]." David F.
Partlett, Punitive Damages: Legal Hot Zones, 56 LA. L. REV. 781, 795 (1996) (citing many
sources, among them, Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How
Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143 (1989) and Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive"
Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831 (1989)).
53. See Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1687 (citing Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice:
Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1436, 1449-50 (1993) (arguing
that punitive damages are a form of "expressive defeat" of conduct juries find "morally
offensive")).
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conclusions. The Court's two arguments, which were detailed above,
relied on a single common claim-that whatever juries are doing
when they award punitive damages they are not engaging in fact-
finding because when they calculate a punitive damages award they
are engaged in a moral enterprise.
The Court could have reached its holding without drawing a
stark contrast between fact-finding and moral judgment. 4 The Court
left open the possibility that the special protection extended by the
Seventh Amendment to jury verdicts is triggered not by the verdict's
function (to compensate) or its method (judgment without moral
reasoning), but by the relative absence of legal standards controlling
the calculation of the damages, compensatory or otherwise. Under
this argument, what distinguishes punitive damages from compensa-
tory damages is not that juries make moral judgments in the former
and factual judgments in the latter, but that the calculation of the
quantum of compensatory damages is not typically controlled by
either statute or constitutional text. Were it to be the case that it
were (for example, in the case of a statutory damage cap), then the
jury's determination-to the extent that it related to the satisfaction
of that legal requirement-would be viewed as a matter of law, not
fact, and an appellate court's review of the trial court's treatment of
the damage cap would be under a de novo, not an abuse of discretion,
standard.55 The Court did not argue, however, that whether a dam-
54. I thank Professor John Goldberg for pointing out this argument to me.
55. This interpretation of the Court's reasoning for its holding in Cooper, albeit attractive,
would require further elaboration that the Court does not offer. For example, if the distinction
between compensatory damages and punitive damages from the perspective of the Seventh
Amendment is not their function but the degree to which each are constrained by legal
standards, why does the Court leave open the question of whether a treble damage rule would
be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard?
We express no opinion on the question whether Gasperini would govern-and de novo
review would be inappropriate -if a State were to adopt a scheme that tied the award
of punitive damages more tightly to the jury's finding of compensatory damages. This
might be the case, for example, if the State's scheme constrained a jury to award only
the exact amount of punitive damages it determined were necessary to obtain eco-
nomically optimal deterrence or if it defined punitive damages as a multiple of com-
pensatory damages (e.g., treble damages).
Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1687 n.13; see also supra note 32. Second, assuming that the Court's view is
that whenever a jury operates within a legally imposed damages computation rule, de novo
review is required, why is the due process limit of "gross excessiveness" an example of a legal
standard whereas the common law limit of "excessiveness" is not? Finally, assuming that the
Court were to provide a satisfactory answer to these questions (by declaring that the application
of state damage caps and common law excessiveness review should not be raised under Rule
59), the Court would still have had to explain why, as a historical matter, the Court had not
previously characterized the constitutional limitation of due process as a legal constraint on the
computation of punitive damages similar to a cap or a ratio. Its answer to this question would
seem to be that, until Gore, the constitutional due process limit on the computation of punitive
[Vol 78:163
WHAT DID PUNITIVE DAMAGES DO?
ages calculation by a jury counts as "'fact' within the meaning of the
Seventh Amendment's Reexamination Clause '5 6 depended on the
existence of a precise legal rule or constitutional standard under
which it could be reviewed. Rather, what it argued in Cooper was
that whether a damages calculation by a jury counts as "'fact' within
the meaning of the Seventh Amendment's Reexamination Clause"
depended on whether the jury was compensating or punishing. The
former argument, had it been made by the Court, would have put it
on a very different path than the one it pursued.
The problem with an argument that views the jury's tasks of
compensating and punishing as mutually exclusive activities is that it
explains a distinction that did not seem to be in need of explanation.
Until Cooper, the most typical response to the question "why is the
right to a jury protected under the first clause of the Seventh
Amendment?" would have been answered by reference to the second
clause of the Seventh Amendment-because it is the unique province
of the jury to find facts. As the Court said in Dimick v. Schiedt, "[t]he
controlling distinction between the power of the court and that of the
jury is that the former is the power to determine the law and the latter
to determine the facts."57 Since the Seventh Amendment guaranteed
that both compensatory and punitive damages would be determined
by a jury, and the Seventh Amendment protected all findings of fact
in part by requiring appellate courts to review trial courts' judgments
deferentially, it seemed obvious that the Seventh Amendment would
protect punitive damage judgments as jealously as compensatory
awards. That was what Justice Ginsburg concluded when she equated
Gasperini (in which the jury's compensatory award was reviewed by
the appellate court for excessiveness under an abuse of discretion
standard) with Browning-Ferris (in which the jury's punitive damage
award was reviewed for excessiveness under an abuse of discretion
standard).18 The Court's answer was that none of these cases pre-
sented the exact problem raised in Cooper.
damages was not precise enough to function as a legal constraint. This answer has the virtue of
honesty, in that it suggests that Gore changed the constitutional status of punitive damage
calculations by juries, but it does not say why. If the Court's answer is that because punitive
damages were once primarily about compensation and today they are about punishment (as the
first paragraph of note eleven seems to suggest), then it falls back into relying upon a historical
argument, which, as I show, is unsustainable. If the argument is based on another ground, the
Court has an obligation to develop it.
56. Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1686 n. 11.
57. 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
58. Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 1690.
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This response, while technically correct (in Browning-Ferris the
real debate was over whether the Eighth Amendment would apply to
punitive damage judgments and the excessiveness inquiry was con-
ducted under Rule 59),9 misses the point. Until Cooper, the Court
had never suggested that punitive damage judgments were not based
on the same competency-the ability to judge fact-as compensatory
judgments. If anything, the reporters were filled with decisions that
suggested otherwise. For example, in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures
Television, Inc. (which concerned the right to a jury trial for actual
damages), the Court illustrated its holding that "[t]he right to a jury
trial includes the right to have a jury determine the amount of statu-
tory damages" by reference to a litany of classic eighteenth-century
cases in which punitive damages were awarded.6° The reason the
Feltner Court focused on cases involving punitive damages was that it
wanted to emphasize the critical role the jury played in cases where
damages were uncertain: "'the common law rule as it existed at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution' was that 'in cases where the
amount of damages was uncertain[,] their assessment was a matter so
peculiarly within the province of the jury that the Court should not
alter it.' ' 61 According to the Feltner Court, uncertainty was a feature
inherent in compensatory as well as punitive damages, and it was the
jury's special competency with facts that gave it the prerogative
enshrined in the Seventh Amendment. 62
The Court was aware of the fact that history, while not directly
contradicting its holding in Cooper, is in tension with the story it
wants to tell about punitive damages. A lot turns on the claim that,
although unnoticed and unacknowledged, punitive damage judgments
by juries are not matters of fact in the way that the Seventh Amend-
ment means fact. Why had this not been noticed until now, given the
near conflation of compensatory and punitive damages in so much
59. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263-75, 279-80 (1989).
60. 523 U.S. 340, 353 (1998) (citing Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791); Wilkes v.
Wood, Lofft 1, 19, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 499 (C. P. 1763); Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng.
Rep. 768 (C. P. 1763): Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C. L. 6, 7 (1784)).
61. Id. at 353 (alteration in original) (quoting Dimick, 293 U.S. at 480).
62. It is worth recalling Justice Ginsburg's observation that:
Punitive damages are thus not "[u]nlike the measure of actual damages suffered," in
cases of intangible, noneconomic injury. One million dollars' worth of pain and suffer-
ing does not exist as a "fact" in the world any more or less than one million dollars'
worth of moral outrage. Both derive their meaning from a set of underlying facts as
determined by a jury. If one exercise in quantification is properly regarded as fact-
finding ... it seems to me the other should be so regarded as well.
Cooper, 121 S. Ct. at 446 (citations omitted).
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Seventh Amendment jurisprudence? The Court's answer was that
punitive damages themselves had changed; until the twentieth cen-
tury punitive damages were matters of fact because they served to
compensate, not punish. The explanation, which comes late in the
decision, is placed in footnote eleven of the decision. It is so impor-
tant to the Court's overall argument that it is reproduced below:
Nor does the historical material upon which respondent relies so
extensively ... conflict with our decision to require de novo review.
Most of the sources respondent cites merely stand for the proposi-
tion that, perhaps because it is a fact-sensitive undertaking, deter-
mining the amount of punitive damages should be left to the
discretion of the jury....
In any event, punitive damages have evolved somewhat since the
time of respondent's sources. Until well into the 19th century, puni-
tive damages frequently operated to compensate for intangible in-juries, compensation which was not otherwise available under the
narrow conception of compensatory damages prevalent at the time.
See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 61 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting); see also
Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev.
517, 520 (1957) (observing a "vacillation" in the 19th-century cases
between "compensatory" and "punitive" theories of "exemplary
damages"). As the types of compensatory damages available to
plaintiffs have broadened ... the theory behind punitive damages
has shifted towards a more purely punitive (and therefore less fac-
tual) understanding. Cf. Note, 70 Harv. L. Rev., at 520 (noting a
historical shift away from a compensatory -and towards a more
purely punitive-conception of punitive damages). 63
The Court was not saying, I think, that the Seventh Amend-
ment's Reexamination Clause once covered punitive damages and
stopped at some point (perhaps around 1900).64 I think its argument
was simply that, to the extent that the constitutional dimension of a
punitive damage award is triggered by punitive damages when
awarded in order to punish, deter, or express moral condemnation,
punitive damage judgments by juries in the nineteenth century raised
relatively few constitutional concerns since the vast bulk of those
judgments were designed to compensate plaintiffs for intangible
harms such as pain and suffering. If this were true, then the failure of
the Court or others to have seen that an appellate court could not
review a trial court's judgment about the excessiveness of punitive
63. Id. at 1686 n.11 (some citations omitted).
64. Although if the court was making this argument, it would be an interesting application
of Lessig's "Erie Effect" theory of legal translation. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Transla-
tion, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity
and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995).
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damages in the same way would have been understandable, and
would explain why so many lawyers still hold the confused idea that
punitive damage verdicts should be treated under the Due Process
Clause like judgments relating to concrete losses.
The Court's historical account about the two different functions
of punitive damages in 1850 versus 1950 is an important part of its
overall argument, because without it, the Court would have been in
the awkward position of having created a distinction-jury judgments
that "are about facts" versus jury judgments that are "about moral-
ity"-that solves a problem that one might think the Court invented.
Nonetheless the Court still needed to explain why it chose to treat
jury judgments that are labeled "punitive damages that violate the
Fourteenth Amendment" differently from every other type of jury
judgment-including some that are excessive only under common law
standards. The Court's answer, underwritten by footnote eleven, was,
in essence, that punitive damages are now more frequently about
morality than before, and that juries, although asked to do the job,
are not as competent at moral judgment as they were (and are) at
judging facts (even facts relating to the value of pain and suffering,
reputation, or dignity).
II. PAIN, DISTRESS, AND INSULT: THE MANY MEANINGS OF
COMPENSATION
The only problem with footnote eleven is that it is wrong. The
idea that punitive damages once performed a compensatory function
was based on two arguments, one historical and the other doctrinal.
The historical argument looked to the statements found in
nineteenth-century opinions and treatises that say that the reason
punitive damages were awarded in tort cases was to compensate for
intangible injuries such as humiliation, sense of insult, and other
forms of mental anguish. The doctrinal argument compared the set of
compensatory damages available to a typical plaintiff in the nine-
teenth century to the expanded set available to a plaintiff today. It
notes that the intangible injuries punitive damages addressed in the
nineteenth century are compensable under contemporary categories
of personal injury, such as emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of
life, and the like. The doctrinal argument concludes that, since
punitive damages are no longer needed to do what they once did,
they must be awarded for something else-punishment and deter-
rence.
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The doctrinal argument depends on the historical argument, and
the historical argument stands or falls on the strength of the evidence
that punitive damages were awarded in the nineteenth century to
compensate for pain and suffering damages. What is the evidence?
The Court in Cooper relied heavily on two sources for its claim.
The first was Justice O'Connor's dissent in Haslip, where she stated
that punitive damages were awarded to fill a "gap" created by the fact
that in the past, "compensatory damages were not available for pain,
humiliation and other forms of intangible injury. '65 The second was a
student note published in the Harvard Law Review in 1951.66 It
should be noted that in Haslip, Justice O'Connor relied (again) on the
1951 Harvard Law Review note and Redden's Punitive Damages, a
leading treatise.67
The Harvard note and the Redden treatise tell a story in which
punitive damages were clearly awarded as compensation for
"wounded feelings" in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
a situation that was necessitated by the unavailability of noneconomic
compensatory damages.6 The author of the Harvard note com-
mented that during this time, the Illinois courts "restricted 'actual
damages' to out-of-pocket pecuniary loss and did not include intangi-
ble harm. '69 Yet both the Harvard note and Redden describe the
law's attitude towards punitive damages as one of "confusion"
between compensation and punishment.70 To be sure, both texts
claim that the confusion was cleared up by the end of the late nine-
teenth century, because of the broadening of actual damages to
include intangible harms.7' The story these texts tell, relied upon by
the court in Cooper, is one in which punitive damages grew out of one
function (compensating intangible injury) into another (punishment)
because the conception of personal injury in nineteenth-century
America grew broader and more sensitive to psychological harm.
One might say that it is a story where "law follows function."
65. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 61 (1991).
66. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1951).
67. K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES (1980).
68. Id. § 2.3(A); Note, supra note 66, at 519-20.
69. Note, supra note 66, at 520.
70. See REDDEN, supra note 67 § 2.3(B) (discussing Boston Mfg. Co. v. Fiske (1820);
Wiggin v. Coffin (1836)); Note, supra note 66, at 519 (discussing Merest v. Harvey (1814)).
71. REDDEN, supra note 67, § 2.3(B) ("[The mid-nineteenth century was] to witness an
almost total eclipse of the compensatory function precedent to, although very nearly contempo-
raneous with, the growing incidence of actual damage recovery for mental suffering"); Note,
surpa note 66, at 520.
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The law follows function argument has a certain pedigree. It can
be traced back to the debate in the middle of the nineteenth century
between two of America's leading scholars. Theodore Sedgwick (a
practicing lawyer and an editor) and Harvard's Simon Greenleaf
sparred very publicly over punitive damages. Professor Greenleaf
argued that punitive damages were a mistake because they confused
public and private law functions. Thus, in his very influential Treatise
on the Law of Evidence, Greenleaf categorically rejected punitive
damages." Sedgwick, who wrote an equally influential treatise
entitled A Treatise on the Measure of Damages, rejected Greenleaf's
methods and conclusions. 3  The law, Sedgwick argued in 1847,
"permits the jury to give what it terms punitory, vindictive, or exem-
plary damages; in other words, blends together the interest of society
and the aggrieved individual, and gives damages not only to recom-
pense the sufferer but to punish the offender. ' '74
Sedgwick was right-only a handful of courts opposed punitive
damages.75 But Greenleaf and his defenders were not impressed by
the fact that both English and American common law were commit-
ted to the concept of exemplary or punitive damages. Their point was
that, as Thomas Street argued, it really made no difference what the
courts said, since "damages which in one jurisdiction are recoverable
as exemplary damages are, in another jurisdiction, recovered under
the guise of compensatory damages for mental suffering, insult, or
outrage. '76 Even Sedgwick had to admit that there was a tendency
72. 2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 240 n.2 (16th ed.
1899).
73. According to Perry Miller, Sedgwick considered Greenleaf to be an academic formalist
and a "logic chopper." See THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA 184 (Perry Miller ed., 1962) (quoting
Sedgwick). It is tempting to view Sedgwick as a protorealist and antiformalist, but Morton
Horwitz cautions against this view. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 83 (1977).
74. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 39 (Arno Press
1972) (1847).
75. At various times between 1860 and 1920, Massachusetts, Colorado, Connecticut,
Louisiana, Nebraska, Washington, Michigan, and New Hampshire had rejected punitive
damages. See 1 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 358
(9th ed., 1912); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive
Damages: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1302 (1993).
76. 1 THOMAS ATKINS STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 480 (1906). He
noted that in Wisconsin, the same intentional tort was tried three times, twice with jury
instructions permitting exemplary damages, and once without, and that the verdict awarded in
each trial was the same. Id. (citing Bass v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 36 Wis. 450 (1875); Bass v.
Chicago, etc. R. Co., 39 Wis. 636 (1878); Bass v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 42 Wis. 654 (1881)).
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among some states, such as West Virginia, to call damages for pain
and suffering exemplary damages."
The most famous defense of the Greenleaf position is Justice
Foster's opinion in Fay v. Parker, which roundly attacks punitive
damages as a "deformity" on "the sound and healthy body of the
law. '78 Justice Foster's objection was not that he thought that a jury
should not hear evidence of a defendant's proven malice in determin-
ing damages. Justice Foster, an avowed opponent to punitive dam-
ages, thought it was obvious that sometimes the amount of pain and
suffering experienced by the plaintiff was a function of the defen-
dant's motive. His opposition to punitive damages stemmed from the
fact that they were an impermissible form of "double counting":
Call them what you may, compensatory in fact, or punitory in their
operation; if the same damages are awarded but once the distinc-
tion is merely verbal.., when we tell juries to give the plaintiff
what the defendant ought to pay and the plaintiff ought to receive,
in view of the wrong and suffering inflicted by the malice, insult,
and indignity exhibited by the circumstances of the case.79
In fact, Justice Foster was intent on clearing up any misunder-
standing about where he and Greenleaf stood. He noted that Sedg-
wick recruited Chancellor Kent as an ally. 80 Kent, reported Sedgwick,
denounced any attempt to "'exclude all considerations of the malice
and wickedness and the wantonness"' of the tortfeasor in the calcula-
tion of the "'proper compensation of the victim."'' Justice Foster
argued that Kent's denunciation was not directed at Greenleaf, since
Greenleaf would have agreed with the sentiment.8 2 Kent was attack-
ing an anonymous writer in the Law Reporter who in 1847 argued that
"'there would seem to be no reason why a plaintiff should receive
greater damages from a defendant who has intentionally injured him,
than one who has accidentally injured him,.., his loss being the same
in both cases."'' 83 Justice Foster was quite angry that anyone would
claim the view stated in the Law Reporter to be Greenleaf's or his.
The view expressed in the Law Reporter was "so repugnant to 'social
77. See SEDGWICK, supra note 75, § 359 (noting that Nevada and Wyoming follow the
same practice).
78. 53 N.H. 342, 397 (1872).
79. Id. at 361-62.
80. Id. at 357, (citing SEDGWICK ON DAMAGES 466 (5th ed.); 1 KENT'S COM. 606 (11th
ed.)).
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sympathy' that it would be monstrous, if it were not, instead, ridicu-
lous." 84 It was, in short, a straw man, and it did not represent the true
viewpoint of the opponents to Sedgwick's theory of punitive damages.
The true theory of compensation that Greenleaf held, according
to Justice Foster, was quite subtle. It was based on the fact that "an
injury to property or character is totally different from an injury to
feelings."85 Compensation for pain should come in two forms. The
first is purely subjective: what did the plaintiff experience as a conse-
quence of the injury? The second is intersubjective: what did the
plaintiff experience as a consequence of the defendant possessing a
certain attitude when the tort occurred? Justice Foster therefore
argued that tortfeasors who engage in intentional torts inflict two
different injuries when they cause the victim to suffer:
[I]f A plunges his knife into B and burns his house and accuses him
of forgery, and the person and property and reputation of B are
injured thereby, such injuries to person, property, and reputation
are not spoken of as injuries to the spirit, or soul, or mind. The
knife causes pain, but the pain is always taken in the sense of bodily
pain only; and if we have reference to the mental suffering, the
sense of disgrace, the wounded honor, &c., we always go on to de-
scribe it by other words than "injuries to person, property, and
character." 86
The distinction drawn by Justice Foster seems easy to accept:
physical pain and mental suffering are simply different sorts of
hedonic loss. The fear that arises during an assault, for example, is
not physical pain because, by definition, it is in anticipation of physi-
cal contact and pain.87 But just because there is a difference between
physical pain and mental suffering does not mean that mental suffer-
ing was "in fact" what punitive damages were compensating. To see
why, recall that the tort of assault was one of the earliest torts.88
Courts routinely awarded compensatory damages for mental suffer-
ing throughout the nineteenth century. And while courts routinely
awarded punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages in
assault, there is no evidence to suggest that they were awarding
punitive damages (when they awarded punitive damages) in order to
satisfy a functional need that could not be fulfilled by existing doc-
84. Id. at 360.
85. Id. at 358.
86. Id. at 359 (emphasis added).
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 21 cmt. c, 24 cmt. c, 29 cm.t a, 905 cmt. e.
88. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 10 (4th ed. 1971)
(citing cases from fourteenth- and seventeenth-century England).
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trinal categories. In fact, it appears that courts had no trouble distin-
guishing between mental suffering (which was the basis of awarding
damages to compensate the victim) and punitive damages (which
were awarded, but not to compensate the victim). For example, in
Newell v. Whitcher, the plaintiff was a young blind woman who was
the target of threatening sexual demands.89 The Supreme Court of
Vermont held that the defendant's conduct (leaning over the plaintiff
"with the proffer of criminal sexual intercourse") was actionable
assault and upheld the jury verdict of $225 compensatory damages for
mental suffering and $100 punitive damages without comment. 90 If, as
Justice Foster argued, punitive damages were needed to make up a
gap in the court's ability to recognize and compensate mental suffer-
ing, why were the courts able to recognize, measure, and compensate
the injury resulting from assault in a case like Newell? Under the
logic urged by the law follows function argument, assault should have
been entirely a matter of punitive damages -and yet the cases reveal
just the opposite.
For Justice Foster and Greenleaf, the question was not whether
nineteenth-century tort law was able to compensate some forms of
mental suffering, but whether the tort law could recognize the mental
suffering that was associated with the award of punitive damages.
Mental suffering resulting from a "sense of disgrace [or] wounded
honor" was in need of punitive damages' crypto-compensatory
function, since it would have otherwise been left unremedied. 9' It is
crucial to see that the category of mental suffering at issue is not
defined so much by its scale (extreme distress vs. minor anxiety) or its
connection to physical manifestation ("pure" emotional distress vs.
consequential emotional distress), but its etiology. The injury identi-
fied by Justice Foster and Greenleaf is one in which the subjective
mental state of the defendant changes the subjective experience of
the victim. The injury is found not in the insult expressed by the
defendant, but in its effect on the victim. In this way, the damages
that result from insult are unlike the damages that result from defa-
mation. In defamation, the injury caused by a false statement is to
one's reputation, not to one's feelings. 92 According to Justice Foster
89. 53 Vt. 589, 590-91 (1880).
90. Id. at 589-91.
91. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559. More generally, a defamatory
statement was a statement that "caused the plaintiff to be shunned or avoided by oth-
ers.., lowering her in the esteem of the community or deterring people from associating or
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and Greenleaf, the injurious aspect of insulting and humiliating
tortuous conduct lay exactly in its reception by the victim.93
Once one defines the precise contours of the type of injury that
the "punitive damages equals compensation" camp describes as the
primary focus of punitive damages in the nineteenth century, it is
clear that, on one descriptive level, it was correct: the tort law did not
recognize as a separate compensable form of mental suffering the
hedonic loss flowing from being subjected to insult and disgrace. If it
were really the case that the law viewed such losses as palpable in the
same way that it viewed physical pain or the mental suffering caused
by assault, then the law follows function argument would be strength-
ened by evidence that the law came to recognize such damages as
palpable damages for which compensation ought to be paid. As I will
show below, however, there is very little evidence that the common
law ever revealed a suppressed desire to recognize such a category of
hedonic loss, either in the nineteenth century or even later, under the
tort of the intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED").
As an initial matter, the evidence that any court conceived of
"insult" as a compensable category in tort in the nineteenth century is
ambiguous at best. For example, in 1872 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court went as far as distinguishing between two types of compensa-
tory damages: those which may be recovered for "actual" loss (which
includes "loss of time, bodily pain and suffering, impaired physical or
mental powers, mutilation and disfigurement, necessary expenses of
surgical and other attendance,") and those for "injuries to the feel-
ings" (which includes "the insult, the indignity, the public exposure
and contumely;"); however, this second category was only available if
the defendant was "animated by a malicious motive. ' 94 But in 1875
dealing with her." DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 403 (2000). This has been understood
to mean false statements that lead others to believe reputation-harming false things about the
victim. Insults, of course, may be hurtful even if they are believed by no one. The common law
of defamation left some conceptual space for defamatory statements that were neither true nor
false. See Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936) (plaintiff was photographed in
way that was grotesque but obviously unrealistic; court found that falsity was not an element of
defamation).
93. This is why a number of courts in the nineteenth century held that a plaintiff who
provoked a defendant's immoral and illegal act could only recover mitigated punitive damages,
regardless of the evidence the plaintiff might have as to the actual emotional distress that the
defendant's wrongdoing may have caused, as evidenced by the fact that the defendant would
still be obliged to pay full compensatory damages. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
94. Wilson v. Young, 31 Wis. 574, 582 (1872). Unlike the New Hampshire Supreme Court,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court had no trouble adopting Justice Foster's theory of the varieties of
compensatory damages and also awarding punitive damages:
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the court reversed itself, noting that in trying to understand Sedgwick,
it had grown confused.95 It now understood that Sedgwick had meant
to distinguish between:
"[T]he mental suffering produced by the act or omission in ques-
tion: vexation: anxiety:" which he holds to be ground for compensa-
tory damages: and the "sense of wrong or insult, in the sufferer's
breast from an act dictated by a spirit of willful injustice, or by a
deliberate intention to vex, degrade, or insult," which he holds to
be ground for exemplary damages only.96
The former category, something that Greenleaf's nemesis was
more than willing to concede, was entirely a matter of compensation,
since "vexation" and "anxiety" are mental deprivations, that are not,
in the end, a function of the tortfeasor's state of mind.97 The latter
category, on the other hand, might be. It was this second category
about which Sedgwick was skeptical.
[lI]njuries to the feelings... [for] the insult, the indignity, the public exposure and
contumely, and the like... [which] unlike those for mere personal and bodily in-
jury.., can only be recovered when the aggressor is animated by a malicious motive-
when there is an intention on his part to outrage the feelings of the injured party.
[Yet] the right to recover exemplary damages rests upon precisely the same grounds.
Id. (citing SEDGWICK ON DAMAGES at 33) (emphasis added).
95. Craker v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 657, 677 (1875).
96. Id. (quoting SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES at 35).
97. A tortfeasor's state of mind may add to or increase a plaintiff's vexation or anxiety (I
would be more afraid if I knew that my assailant's purpose was to kill me and not just injure
me), but that is just to say that victims rationally attribute a greater probability of suffering an
injury to situations where the tortfeasor has exhibited a proportionately greater ability to inflict
the injury. Emotional suffering resulting from a rational response to a threat is not a response
to insult but to threat.
There is a middle ground between Greenleaf's and Sedgwick's positions, which is that
Sedgwick is correct as a matter of theory, but that Greenleaf is right as a matter of practice.
That is to say, that the mental suffering called "anxiety" and "vexation," which is the subject of
compensatory damages, is distinct and separate from the wrong of "insult" and "humiliation,"
which is itself not an injury but might produce "anxiety" and "vexation," but that there is no
way for juries to separate the two in practice. In Craker the court made just this argument:
[Of course] mental suffering, vexation and anxiety are subject of compensation in
damages. And it is difficult to see how these are to be distinguished from the sense of
wrong and insult arising from injustice and the intention to vex and degrade.... But if
there be a subtle, metaphysical distinction which we cannot see, what human creature
can penetrate the mysteries of his own sensations, and parcel out separately his mental
suffering and his sense of wrong-so much for compensatory, and so much for vindic-
tive damages? ... If possible, juries are surely not metaphysicians to do it.
Id. at 678.
There was a reason for the court's willingness to fudge the border between compensatory
and punitive damages, even in the teeth of Sedgwick's distinction: the defendant in this case was
a railway, and at the time the case was brought, Wisconsin, like many states, would not have
allowed the plaintiff to recover punitive damages against the railway in respondeat superior at
all. So, if evidence of the defendant's employee's malice was to be properly placed before the




Of course, one might argue that the absence of any explicit char-
acterization of the "sense of wrong or insult, in the sufferer's breast
from an act dictated by a spirit of willful injustice, or by a deliberate
intention to vex, degrade, or insult" as compensable mental suffering
in the nineteenth century proves nothing, since it was exactly the
absence of judicial recognition that forced these damages to travel
under the guise of punitive damages. But that is not exactly correct,
as the two cases from Wisconsin illustrate. Furthermore, legal
scholars in the nineteenth century were already developing a contem-
poraneous version of the law follows function argument. Thomas
Street took the position that Greenleaf was ultimately correct in that
the "true goal" of tort law is to compensate only, but that arguments
like the one made by Justice Foster were premature:
What seems really to have happened here, is that in the course of
legal development the law of damage has outstripped the concep-
tion of legal wrong....
If it had been practicable for the judges to analyze and define for
the jury with precision all the elements of legal harm which enter
into every case, there would have been no necessity for the recogni-
tion of the idea of punishment as a proper end in the administration
of the law of civil wrong. But they did not essay this task
and... [t]he doctrine of exemplary damages answered this end well
enough for practical purposes, and hence gained currency. As our
theory of wrong catches up with the law of damage, the idea of pun-
ishment will appear more and more out of place in the civil system,
and it may possibly in time altogether disappear.98
Street was making a prediction-that someday the tort law
would develop completely and no longer need the fiction of punitive
damages. He admitted that day had not yet arrived by 1906.99 But it
is crucial to the law follows function argument that such a day must
have arrived at some point near the end of the nineteenth century, if
the historical claim about the recession of punitive damages' compen-
satory function is to make any sense. One might argue that Street's
prediction has been proven true by the emergence of the tort of
IIED. This argument would not have been as helpful to the Court in
Cooper as would appear at first glance, since even if it were true, it
would have left an embarrassing lacuna of at least fifty years.1m0
98. STREET, supra note 76, at 488 (emphasis added).
99. Id.
100. The tort of lIED is of relatively recent vintage. It was recognized in the Restatement
of Torts in 1948, although it had been the subject of intense scholarly speculation before that
date. See, e.g., Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936). The argument made by the Court is that punitive damages ceased
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Regardless of its theoretical value, the argument has a worse defect: it
is simply wrong as a doctrinal matter. The early punitive damages
cases were not proto-IIED cases, and one would have to stretch the
doctrine far out of shape to fit those cases into IIED as it has come to
be known in this century.
IIED is actionable when the defendant (1) causes severe emo-
tional distress, (2) intentionally or recklessly, (3) by extreme and
outrageous conduct.10 1 There is no question that lIED is a tort in
which punitive damages are available-as an intentional tort, proof of
the underlying tort creates a set of circumstances where the predicate
of punitive damages would be proven as well. But that is not relevant
to the issue at hand. The question is whether the torts that were
brought under the rubric of punitive damages before the tort of lIED
was recognized were torts that today would be recognized as satisfy-
ing the elements of the tort defined in Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 46.
The historical record suggests that the answer would be "no." It
is true that many of the cases involving common carriers-especially
railroads-that were brought throughout the end of the nineteenth
century and the early part of the twentieth century look like primitive
versions of IIED.lm0 Here, of course, there is an entirely different
possible explanation, which is that the tort law had already recog-
nized that common carriers, as well as innkeepers, had elevated duties
to the public. As Dobbs noted, "[t]he special liability of carriers was
somewhat peculiar and courts today might well conclude that liability
for a carrier's insult alone is no longer justified because more finely
tuned rules now apply to all defendants.' '" 3 The tort of lIED is
distinct from the liability of common carriers and innkeepers because
serving a compensatory function by the end of the nineteenth century because the interest for
which they insured compensation -wounded feelings-was now deemed compensable under
personal injury law.
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46.
102. For example, railroads and trolley companies were held liable for, among other things,
"wrongfully ejecting passengers; carrying passengers past their stations; accosting patrons in
insulting fashions; failing to stop when signaled; failing to care for known sick; refusing to carry
the blind; allowing insults and fights; willfully delaying of passengers; and obstructing the
tracks." Alfred G. Nichols, Jr., Comment, Punitive Damages in Mississippi-A Brief Survey, 37
Miss. L.J. 131, 138 (1965) (citations omitted). Consequently, one of the most important debates
surrounding punitive damages at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the
twentieth was whether corporations should be held liable for the intentional and insulting
conduct of their agents. See Seymour D. Thompson, Liability of Corporations for Exemplary
Damages, 41 CENT. L.J. 308, 309 (1895).
103. DOBBS, supra note 92, § 303.
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of the requirement that the defendant cause severe emotional distress
through outrageous behavior.
Perhaps, seen through the eyes of nineteenth-century legal cul-
ture, the acts that led to the award of punitive damages were not
merely insulting (which is how we may view them today), but were
experienced, within the culture in which they took place, as giving rise
to extreme emotional responses. Barring a full historical and socio-
logical study of the meaning of "insult" in nineteenth-century Amer-
ica, the next best way to test this hypothesis would be to look at the
cases that Street chose for his chapter on punitive damages in his
treatise 0'° It was in this book that Street propounded the argument to
which I referred above-that, in theory, the law should be able to
describe hedonic loss so precisely that the full compensation of those
losses would render punitive damages unnecessary. 05 The chapter on
punitive damages selects nine exemplars from English and American
tort law in which "the assessment of exemplary dam-
ages... illustrate[s] the steps by which the doctrine has taken
shape."' 16 Given this view, one might think that the examples chosen
by Street would illustrate his argument. If his prediction was that one
day the tort law's theory of wrong would "catch up" with the
compensatory ideal, and one believes that the theory of wrong to
which he was referring concerned the wrong of lIED, then one would
think that we should be able to map the early punitive damages cases
selected by Street onto the modern tort of lIED.107 So a brief review
of the nine cases is warranted.
1. Huckle v. Money (1763):08 In this well-known early punitive
damages case, the defendant was the "king's messenger," or, in other
words, the government of England. The King had arrested the
plaintiff, a printer, because he had printed a newspaper critical of the
Crown's policies. Despite the fact that the plaintiff had been treated
courteously while in custody, the court found that punitive damages
were allowable.
104. One of the best attempts to do something like this, with a focus on the different ways
private law has allowed compensation for insult in Germany and France (but not the United
States) is James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J.
1279 (2000).
105. STREET, supra note 76, at 479, 488-89.
106. Id. at 483.
107. Nor is Street's sample set idiosyncratic. Many of the nine cases are part of the usual list
which appears in classic and modem scholarship on punitive damages.
108. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).
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2. Tullidge v. Wade (1769): 109 Like many early punitive damages
cases, this was a case against the defendant for the seduction of the
plaintiff's daughter. The court stressed that the damages were for the
public "insult" expressed by the defendant's act.
3. Merest v. Harvey (1814):11 0 The plaintiff was a gentleman and
the defendant was a magistrate and a member of parliament. The
defendant asked to join the plaintiff's shooting party, and upon being
refused, insulted the plaintiff. The court stressed that punitive
damages in this case should be seen as a substitute for dueling.
4. Sears v. Lyons (1818):111 The defendant trespassed on the
plaintiff's farm and poisoned his chickens. The court said that the
jury could "consider also the object with which it [the poisoned
barley] was thrown" and award punitive damages in excess of the
replacement value of the livestock.
5. Warwick v. Foulkes (1844): 112 This was another case of false
imprisonment, although today it would be called abuse of process.
The defendant charged the plaintiff with a felony and then recanted
his accusation at trial. The court held that the defendant's "persis-
tence" in maintaining this false charge could be taken into account to
warrant the award of punitive damages.
6. Emblen v. Myers (1860):113 The defendant wanted the land
owned by his neighbor, the plaintiff. The defendant arranged to have
two old houses pulled down on his own property in such a way that
they fell onto the plaintiff's property, destroying the plaintiff's stable.
The court approved an instruction which allowed punitive damages if
the defendant acted "with a high hand."
7. Borland v. Barrett (1882):14 The defendant had been assigned
seats in a hotel dining room for a long period of time. When he
returned from a trip, he discovered the plaintiff in his wife's seat.
Upon the plaintiff's refusal to vacate the seat, the defendant hit the
plaintiff over the head with a bottle of sauce and an ugly scene
ensued. The jury was instructed that it may award punitive damages.
109. 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (K.B. 1769).
110. 129 Eng. Rep. 761 (1814).
111. 171 Eng. Rep. 658 (1818).
112. 152 Eng. Rep. 1298 (1844).
113. 158 Eng. Rep. 23 (1860).
114. 76 Va. 128 (1882).
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8. Smith v. Holcomb (1868):115 The report of the case, which
states that the defendant struck the plaintiff, does not give more
detail. The court held that the jury should award punitive damages,
since in a case of battery, "[t]he insult and indignity inflicted upon a
person by giving him a blow with anger, rudeness or inso-
lence... [may] constitute the principal element [of the mental
suffering]."116
9. Keyse v. Keyse (1886):117 The tort case, which arose in the con-
text of a divorce proceeding, was for the alienation of affections. The
plaintiff, the husband in the divorce, sued the defendant, the wife's
corespondent, for damages. The court said that the jury was not to
"punish at all" but could take into account the destruction of the
plaintiff's "happy life" by the defendant.
These cases describe a fascinating variety of circumstances under
which punitive damages were awarded, but they do not, in my opin-
ion, describe the functional equivalent of IIED. Huckle and Warwick
would certainly warrant punitive damages today, but not because they
are cases of IIED. They are cases of false imprisonment conjoined
with an abuse of process, either by the state or a private citizen.
While such intentional torts are wrong according to the common law
and under applicable civil rights statutes, the ground for their being
wrong is not that they are forms of outrageous conduct that cause
extreme emotional distress (although sometimes they may be just
that). One might argue that the real ground for punitive damages in
Huckle is that "oppressive conduct of government agents" is the
insult, not the imprisonment."8 This would put Huckle and Warwick
on the same conceptual footing as Merest. That may be the case, but
that still does not mean that the "oppressive conduct" punished in
these cases is functionally the mental suffering for which compensa-
tory damages are awarded in IIED. The injury sustained by the
printer in Huckle, the criminal defendant in Warwick, or the noble-
man in Merest was not like the injuries that comprise typical horn-
115. 99 Mass. 552 (1868).
116. Id. at 554-55.
117. 11 P.D. 100 (1886).
118. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 75, at 1287.
In Huckle, a false imprisonment and trespass action against agents of the King, Lord
Camden's introduction of the term "exemplary damages" comprised the first use of the
phrase as a formal legal doctrine. English courts employed the remedy from that point
on to punish and deter the misuse of wealth and power that threatened the eighteenth
century English social order.
Id. at 1288-89.
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book examples of modern IIED cases, such as the injury suffered by
an African American who is subjected to repeated and threatening
racial epithets in the course of doing business or a woman who is
subjected to repeated and threatening sexual advances." 9
Sears and Emblen are even more troublesome cases for the ar-
gument that the injuries once captured by punitive damages are those
now addressed by IIED. From a psychological and doctrinal point of
view, economic torts are not obviously the most fertile ground upon
which to base a claim for extreme emotional distress based on outra-
geous conduct.120 Certainly the common law has allowed IIED claims
to be based on the intentional destruction of chattel: in LaPorte v.
Associated Independents, Inc., the court allowed punitive damages
where the defendant maliciously destroyed the plaintiff's dog in her
presence. 2' But in a case like that, the intent of the defendant is to
produce extreme emotional distress by means of property destruc-
tion. In the cases cited by Street, it appears that the defendant's goal
was to interfere with the economic interests of the plaintiff. Even if
one could presume that the defendant had to have been substantially
certain that his destruction of the plaintiff's chattel would evoke an
emotional reaction, it seems that the real purpose of awarding puni-
tive damages for poisoning chickens or destroying a barn was to
punish the defendant for intentional interference with the plaintiff's
interests. In this sense, cases like Sears and Emblen are analogous to
Cooper, TXO, and Gore. There may be many valid reasons to
support punitive damages in cases involving willful interference with
another's economic interests, ranging from retribution to deterrence,
but compensation for emotional distress does not seem to be the right
description.
The remaining cases discussed by Street, Tullidge, Borland,
Smith, and Keyse, could all be viewed as concerning, on one level or
another, insults leveled by the defendant towards the plaintiff. When
one harms another through sexual impropriety, one holds the other
up to social humiliation and ridicule. When one hits another, espe-
119. It is instructive to compare the cases in Street's list with modern cases of IIED. See,
e.g., Brown v. Manning, 764 F. Supp. 183 (M.D. Ga. 1991); Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580
(Ariz. 1987).
120. Damages for intentional interference with an economic interest may include emotional
distress under limited circumstances, usually involving a special relationship or a special
vulnerability on the part of the victim. Emotional distress comprises an important component
of claims for bad faith breach of insurance contract. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 795
P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
121. 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964).
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cially in public, one is telling the victim that his social status is so low
that the law does not protect him. Marc Galanter and David Luban
argue that tortfeasors who assert "undeserved mastery" over tort
victims inflict an "injury to honor" that can only be compensated
through punitive damages:
[C]ulpably harming another person or being culpably negligent ex-
presses a false view of the wrongdoer's value relative to that of the
victim. Implicitly it says that the victim is a "low" person, the sort of
person toward whom one can act in such a manner. Or it says that
the wrongdoer is more valuable than the victim, indeed an espe-
cially valuable and "high" kind of person, the sort of person who is
entitled to take liberties with the well-being of others. Or it says
both: the wrongdoer is especially valuable and the victim is the sort
of person that it is all right to treat badly. I am high and you are
low.
1 22
The problem with this argument is that it may be an accurate de-
scription of the function of punitive damages, both today and in the
past, but it does not establish what the law follows function argument
needs to prove. It is very likely that the victims in Tullidge, Borland,
Smith, and Keyse were insulted by the defendants' acts. It is also
possible that Galanter and Luban are correct in that the sort of insult
experienced by the victims in these cases comes from the defendants'
contemptible desire to express mastery over others. But there needs
to be a connection between the insult experienced by the victims and
the attitudes of the injurers that would support the conclusion that
the injury that resulted is functionally identical to extreme emotional
distress based on outrageous conduct. It is only this latter claim that
would be of any use to someone like Street or Greenleaf. Galanter
122. Galanter & Luban, supra note 53, at 1432-33 (citing Jean Hampton, The Retributive
Idea, in JEAN HAMPTON & JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 157 (1988)).
To illustrate their point, Galanter and Luban refer back to early punitive damages cases:
In Grey v. Grant [1764] the court upheld a punitive award because "the plaintiff [had]
been used unlike a gentleman." The court in Huckle v. Money stated that "the state,
degree, quality, trade or profession of the party injured, as well as of the person who
did the injury, must be and generally are, considered by a jury in giving damages."
And in Forde v. Skinner [1830], the jury was instructed that if the hair of female pau-
pers was cut off in a poor house against their will "with the malicious intent.., of
'taking down their pride,' ... that will be an aggravation and ought to increase the
damages."
Id. at 1433-34 (alterations in original); see also Ellis, supra note 3, at 14-15.
The reported cases from roughly the first quarter of the seventeenth century through
the first quarter of the nineteenth century ... [t]hey included cases of slander, seduc-
tion, assault and battery in humiliating circumstances, criminal conversion, malicious
prosecution, illegal intrusion into private dwellings and seizure of private papers, tres-
pass onto private land in an offensive manner, and false imprisonment. Diverse as
they may have been, all of these cases share one common attribute: they involved acts
that resulted in affronts to the honor of the victims.
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and Luban did not insist that the reason that punitive damages are
justified is because they are a form of compensation for mental
suffering. In fact, they argued that punitive damages, although
triggered by the defendant's insulting behavior, are not explicable in
terms of compensation:
In our view, awarding compensatory damages alone may not suffice
to remedy this injury to honor, but may actually iterate it. The
norm of exacting from the wrongdoer compensation equivalent to
the victim's loss measures the "deserved" loss of the wrongdoer by
the undeserved loss of the victim. 123
Galanter and Luban did not characterize the wrongs resulting
from the defendants' conduct in a case like Tullidge or Borland in
terms of emotional distress because they had no interest in deploying
a compensation-based argument. Their view was that the justification
for punitive damages is that it is a special form of retribution (what
they called "poetic justice").124 So even if Galanter and Luban are
correct and the rationale for the award of punitive damages in many
of the early (and even contemporary) cases is that the defendant's
conduct inflicted an insult upon the victim, their argument does not
support the view that the institution of punitive damages was an early
attempt to provide damages for emotional distress.'2
III. WHAT FUNCTIONS DID PUNITIVE DAMAGES SERVE IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY?
According to the sources cited by the Court in footnote eleven of
Cooper, punitive damages once served a compensatory function and
now they do not. The injury that was once compensated through
punitive damages is hard to specify. The most natural place to look
for a description of that injury would be in the arguments made by
Greenleaf and his supporters, since they also argued that punitive
damages were really just a form of compensatory damages. But as we
have seen, there is a gap between Greenleaf's argument and the
Court's. The Court's argument, that the law of punitive damages
follows the functions it is required to serve under the circumstances of
123. Galanter & Luban, supra note 53, at 1433.
124. Id. at 1438.
125. If the Galanter and Luban argument could be used to support the law follows function
argument, then they would be embarrassed, since, unlike the Court in Cooper or the sources it
cites, they believe that punitive damages still provide damages in response to insult. The whole
point of the Cooper argument is to draw a distinction between the emotional distress compensa-
tion function of the past and the public policy punishment function of today.
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the day, is testable. If punitive damages served a compensatory
function that is today recognized as a compensable loss, then the
earlier function was made unnecessary by changes in the law. The
form of injury which Greenleaf claimed was being compensated by
punitive damages-the mental suffering resulting from mere insult-
is not today a form of compensable injury cognizable under current
tort law. 126 Therefore, reliance on Greenleaf cannot help the law
follows function argument. It still lacks any empirical support.
Furthermore, there is another reason to doubt the law follows
function argument: it requires us to disregard much of what the courts
and other commentators said were the functions of punitive damages
at that time. The challenge to the Court, if it wants to rely on the
sources cited in footnote eleven, is that the record is replete with
statements describing the function of punitive damages as some form
of punishment or retribution, not compensation for emotional dis-
tress.
The positions taken by the majority of courts that adopted the
view that punitive damages were punishment are not uniform and I
will review them in this Section. However, I must acknowledge the
obvious response that the proponents of the law follows function
argument would raise at the outset. They could, I suppose, accept
that many courts and commentators believed that punitive damages
served a punishment function without actually realizing the compen-
satory function that the damages truly served. Such an argument is
not implausible, but it is difficult to disprove. In the face of such
uncertainty, the only thing we can do is weigh what the courts actually
said they were doing then against what they actually are doing now.
On both these counts, the law follows function argument lacks
obvious support.
In my opinion, the leading judicial opinions in the mid-
nineteenth century reveal a range of rationales for punitive damages,
and while it would be difficult to say that the weight of opinion clearly
falls to one side or another, it would be even more difficult to say that
126. This is not to say that Greenleaf was wrong. He was not arguing that the law would
reclassify the damages awarded under punitive damages as compensatory damages. That is the
law follows function argument. It presumes that awarding damages conditioned on the
wrongdoer's motive was just a fig-leaf for increasing the final measure of the victim's mental
suffering. It is possible that Street, in fact, did hold the "fig leaf" position. I suspect that
Greenleaf really did believe that damages conditioned on the wrongdoer's motive were
compensatory, and that his dispute with Sedgwick, while merely verbal and nonoutcome
determinative in most cases, had important theoretical and practical ramifications.
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the weight of opinion supports the view that punitive damages
functioned primarily to compensate emotional suffering. The cases
can be placed into six categories: (1) compensation for emotional
suffering; (2) compensation for insult; (3) personal vindication; (4)
vindication of the state; (5) punishment to set an example; and (6)
punishment to deter. While these categories overlap to some extent,
and the decisions often suggest that more than one rationale is being
adopted, the differences between the categories are worth noting.
1. Compensation for emotional suffering. This rationale for pu-
nitive damages has been discussed fully in Section II. It could include
what today is described as pain and suffering or emotional distress. It
is crucial to the argument of the Court in Cooper that punitive
damages served primarily to secure damages for emotional suffering
in the nineteenth century; this would explain why, for so long, courts
viewed punitive damages as a matter of fact wholly within the jury's
purview. Very few judicial opinions embraced this view. The only
major decision was Fay v. Parker, discussed above. Furthermore,
while it is true that contemporaneous treatises such as Street's
promoted this view (as part of the law follows function argument), it
is not clear to me that Greenleaf necessarily held this view.
2. Compensation for insult. One of Section II's purposes was to
point out that it is possible to see punitive damages as compensatory
and yet still reject the court's view in Cooper that punitive damages
once provided compensation for something which is now recognized
under conventional modern categories of compensable emotional
distress. That is to say, even if punitive damages did (and still)
provide compensation for insult, that function may be utterly differ-
ent from the function of providing compensation for the sort of
emotional distress that accompanies shock (in the case of negligent
infliction of emotional distress) and extreme emotional distress (in
the case of IIED). The loss one suffers when one is insulted may
include a hedonic loss, such as embarrassment and humiliation, but
not necessarily very much, and certainly not at the level that would
rise to compensable emotional distress. One might still demand
compensation for insult even if one did not experience a severe
emotional or psychological feeling.17 In both Germany and America
127. Theron Metcalf put it this way:
The circumstances of time and place, when and where the insult is given, require dif-
ferent damages; as it is a greater insult to be beaten upon the Royal Exchange, than in
a private room.... [Tihat indignity and insult aggravate the accompanying injury; not
that the injury, aside from the insult, is greater on account of the plaintiff's malice.
2003]
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
the same expression was used to capture the idea that insult and the
feelings of wounded pride that accompany it is itself a loss: victims of
insulting conduct would demand "satisfaction" or Genugtuung from
the defendant. I have explored this idea in much greater detail
elsewhere, and for present purposes I will merely note that regardless
of whether one views "satisfaction" as a defensible rationale for
punitive damages, it is not the same thing to which the Court in
Cooper refers when it argues in footnote eleven that punitive dam-
ages served a compensatory function.128
A number of nineteenth-century courts cited compensation for
insult as the rationale for the award of punitive damages. One of the
clearest explanations for this conception of compensation is set out by
the Supreme Court of Michigan in Detroit Dailey Post v. McArthur.129
The case involved the award of punitive damages in a libel case. 1°
The court argued that vindictive or exemplary damages (the expres-
sion at the time for punitive damages) were awarded by the jury in
proportion to evidence of "evil motives," which instantiate the "moral
guilt of the perpetrator. ' 131 The court acknowledged that, although
punitive damages varied in direct proportion to the "blameworthiness
chargeable on wrong-doers," it would be misleading to say that the
damage award was therefore based on the "wrong intent" of the
defendant: the award "is to make reparation for the injury to the
feelings of the person injured.1132 The feelings to which the court
refered were not, however, independent of the moral blameworthi-
ness of the defendant's act.13  The court argued that our "instincts of
common humanity" recognize that an injury inflicted voluntarily is
"often the greatest wrong that can be inflicted, and injured pride and
Theron Metcalf, Damages in Actions ex Delicto, 3 AM. JURIST & LAW MAG. 302-03 (1830)
(quoting 3 Wils. 19).
128. See Anthony J. Sebok, Legal Culture and the Desire for Retribution: Punishment in
German and American Law (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Whitman, supra note
104, at 1319-24.
129. 16 Mich. 447 (1868).
130. Id. at 450.
131. Id. at 452.
132. Id. at 452-53.
133. For this reason, the Michigan Supreme Court believed that it followed from their view
that if the plaintiff was morally blameworthy for having provoked the defendant's intentional
tort, the plaintiff could not claim compensation for wounded feelings even if the defendant's
conduct was nonetheless tortuous and extremely insulting. The plaintiff would be limited to
compensation for bodily pain and suffering only. See Johnson v. McKee, 27 Mich. 471 (1873).
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affection may, under some circumstances, justify very heavy dam-
ages." 134
The reasoning offered by the Michigan Supreme Court reflected
a response to the challenge, raised in a number of jurisdictions, that
punitive damages were a form of double punishment. Other states
followed Michigan's view that the function of punitive damages was
to compensate for the losses resulting from insult. Minnesota, for
example, explicitly adopted the expression "insult" to explain the
source of the wounded feelings for which "punitory" or "exemplary
damages" could be awarded.13 5 Under the "compensation for insult"
conception of punitive damages, punitive damages were not punish-,
ment, so there was no double counting. The Court of Appeals of
Kentucky noted that nothing barred a widow from suing for the death
of her husband, even though the killer might be indicted for a felony:
"[t]he recovery, in one case, is for the private injury, and in the other,
the punishment is inflicted for the public wrong.1136  The court
defended the jury's punitive damage award against the defendant's
argument that the jury instructions did not follow the principle that
punitive damages were not supposed to compensate.137 The judge had
charged the jury thus: "by punitive damages is meant exemplary
damages, by way of smart money, as well as those given by way of
compensation. ' ' 138 The court argued that there was nothing inconsis-
tent with this charge and its view that punitive damages were com-
pensatory, since:
The [first set] of damages are allowed as compensation for the loss
sustained, but the jury are permitted to give exemplary damages on
account of the nature of the injury. It is therefore the increase of
the damages resulting from the character of the defendant's conduct
that is denominated punitive or vindictive. 139
134. Detroit Daily Post Co., 16 Mich. at 453-54 (emphasis added).
135. Minnesota, for example, explicitly adopted the expression "insult" to explain the source
of the wounded feelings for which "punitory or "exemplary damages" could be awarded. Lynd
v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, 200-01(1862); McCarthy v. Niskern, 22 Minn. 90, 90-91 (1875).
136. Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 146, 151 (1859).
137. Id. at 153-154.
138. Id. at 153.
139. Id. at 153-154 (emphasis added). The words in italics contain the heart of the
distinction: the court recognized that the "nature" of the injury (the injured feelings of the
decedent) is controlled not by the force of the defendant's gunshot but by the immoral motive
that led to the gunshot (its "character").
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This view was also adopted by the Supreme Courts of Iowa and
California. 14 0
3. Personal vindication. One of the common expressions for pu-
nitive damages in the nineteenth century was "vindictive damages."
Vindication is obviously not the same thing as compensation, al-
though one could imagine how, under certain circumstances, the act
of vindication might provide, at the same time, compensation for
feelings wounded through insult.141 From an etymological perspec-
tive, the word "vindicate" places the act of imposing punitive dam-
ages in a very different posture than the act of pursuing
compensation. The Latin vindicare means to claim, to set free, or to
punish.42 The Oxford English Dictionary notes that early uses of the
word "vindicate" include "to avenge," "to make or set free" or
"rescue," and "to clear from censure. ' 143 All these senses of the word
suggest that punitive damages, when used to "vindicate" the plaintiff,
allowed the plaintiff to actively address the defendant, and in doing
so, recover or "rescue" his or her honor. In this sense, punitive
damages had a slightly different emphasis than in the sense of com-
pensation. First, the implication in the word "vindicate" is that the
money received does not replace a loss, but is a means by which the
plaintiff's lost honor is returned. Second, it implies that the payment
of the money to the plaintiff is less important than the imposition of
the monetary penalty on the defendant. That is why, of course,
punitive damages in their vindictive form seem to be as much about
punishing the defendant as compensating the plaintiff.
The United States Supreme Court adopted the personal vindica-
tion rationale for punitive damages in Day v. Woodworth in 1851.144
The case involved a trespass by a mill owner against the downstream
dam erected by another mill owner.145 There was no personal injury
and, in modern terms, no credible claim for emotional distress. Yet
the Court allowed the punitive damages.146 The Court, after noting
the controversy surrounding "what are called exemplary, punitive, or
vindictive" damages, argued that it is the very intangibility of wrong
140. Wardrobe v. Cal. Stage Co., 7 Cal. 118 (1857); Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379
(1866). But see Turner v. N. Beach & Mission R.R. Co., 34 Cal. 594 (1868).
141. I explore this possibility in Sebok, supra note 128.
142. 19 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 641 (2d ed. 1989).
143. Id.
144. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
145. Id. at 363.
146. Id. at 370.
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that results from lawless action which explains why such damages are
set apart from compensatory damages:
The wrong done to the plaintiff is incapable of being measured by a
money standard; and the damages assessed depend on the circum-
stances showing the degree of moral turpitude or atrocity of the
defendant's conduct, and may properly be termed.., vindictive
rather than compensatory. 147
The Supreme Court of Illinois explained vindictive damages as
awarded "for the malice and insult" attending the wrong where the
"jury is not bound to adhere to a strict line of compensation.1 48
4. Vindication of the State. Closely related to personal vindica-
tion is the rationale that punitive damages were awarded to vindicate
the insult to the state that the defendant expressed through his
immoral and intentional tortuous conduct. The meanings and impli-
cations drawn from the etymology of the word "vindicate" are left
undisturbed when one reads this rationale expressed by the courts,
but the interest that is recovered by the act of imposing damages must
naturally be restated. As this trial judge in San Francisco put it in his
jury charge:
Where a duty imposed by law is willfully and maliciously refused to
be performed, or performed in such a way as to wound the feelings
of the person to whom it is owing, the injury partakes more or less
of a public character, and extends beyond the mere pecuniary dam-
age sustained by the party against whom it has been committed. 49
It would appear that the courts that raised the possibility that
punitive damages could be awarded to vindicate a violation of the
public's rights were not denying that sometimes punitive damages
were properly awarded to secure purely private vindication. In fact, it
seems that the problem of "public" vindication was raised as a way to
limit punitive damages. In both Indiana and Nebraska the Supreme
Courts of those states took the position that punitive damages could
not be available for actions committed in violation of the criminal
law. Thus, a jury instruction that asked for punitive damages to
"vindicate the law and punish the outrage upon the person of the
147. Id. at 371. Similar reasoning was adopted by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Black
v. Carrollton Railroad Co., 10 La. Ann. 33, 40 (1855).
148. City of Chic. v. Martin, 49 Ill. 241, 244 (1868). It should be noted that the court gave a
mix of rationales for vindictive damages, including "to make an example to the community" and
"to deter [the defendant] and others."
149. Turner v. N. Beach and Mission R.R. Co., 34 Cal. 594, 598 (1868) (quoting the trial
judge). The California Supreme Court overturned the trial judge's instructions but only because
the defendant was an employer, not the employee who did the act.
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plaintiff" was overturned. 10 According to the Indiana Supreme
Court, if a tort was not the subject of criminal punishment, "the
various rights in community to personal security" could be protected
through punitive damages, but where the criminal law reached, "the
state has undertaken to vindicate her own wrongs" and there was no
reason why private individuals should take it upon themselves to
vindicate the same wrong. 51
5. Punishment to set an example. Along with the term "vindic-
tive," the other very popular expression for punitive damages in the
nineteenth century was "exemplary" damages. The terms "vindic-
tive" and "exemplary" are as different to each other as both are to
the term "punitive." "Exemplary" is rooted in the Latin for "exam-
ple," and according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the early usage
of the word included both "serving for an illustration" as well as "a
penalty such as may serve as a warning."'52 When used by courts, it is
clear that exemplary damages were not designed to insure either
compensation or vindication, although certainly either or both could
have been benefits of exemplary damages. Exemplary damages were
primarily designed for the instruction of the public.1 53 In Freidenheit
v. Edmundson, the Supreme Court of Missouri suggested that in a
case of trespass to chattel, the court properly instructed the jury to
give more than the value of the goods and interest, because "such
[additional] damages as would be a good round compensa-
tion.., such as might serve for a wholesome example to others in like
cases.115 4  The awarding of exemplary damages would of course
comfort the plaintiff, but they were not necessarily portrayed as
compensation for either emotional distress or insult: "[ajllowing
damages for wounded feelings, humiliation, and the like is not
equivalent to exemplary damages. 1 55
There is some temptation to say that exemplary damages served
a deterrence rationale, and obviously there is a great deal of overlap
150. Nossaman v. Rickert, 18. Ind. 350 (1862).
151. Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322 (1854); see also Boyer v. Barr, 8 Neb. 68, 74 (1878) (citing
Taber).
152. 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 525 (2d ed. 1989)
153. "[T]he jury are authorized, for the sake of public example, to give such additional
damages as the circumstances require. The tort is aggravated by the evil motive, and on this
rests the rule of exemplary damages." Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489
(1875).
154. 36 Mo. 226, 230 (1865).
155. 3 THOMAS G. SHERMAN & AMASA A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
NEGLIGENCE 1949 (6th ed. 1913).
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between the concept of general deterrence and punishment for
example's sake. But this would be too crude and hasty a picture of
the meaning of exemplary damages. For example, in the 1791 case
Coryell v. Colbaugh (a case of seduction), the defendant argued that
the punitive damages assessed against him (if any) should be very
small since he was poor, and, presumably, the compensatory damages
alone would be enough to punish and deter him. 56 The court rejected
this reasoning, arguing that because the reason to give exemplary
damages was to "prevent such offences in [the] future," the jury was
"bound to no certain damages, but might give such a sum as would
mark [its] disapprobation, and be an example to others" regardless of
the defendant's wealth. 157 Not only is this use of exemplary damages
clearly a rejection of specific deterrence, it suggests that the point of
such damages was not to prevent similar acts by allowing future
wrongdoers to weigh the cost of their wrongdoing, but to use the past
wrongdoing as an opportunity for the community to frame a norm.
Making an example of Colbaugh does not prevent future wrongdoing
by setting a price but by clearly establishing the seriousness with
which the community rejected the conduct in question. One might
even describe the phenomenon of exemplary damages as a concrete
example of the expressive use of punishment, where punishment is
not inflicted to alter criminals' cost-benefit analysis but to alter
criminals' sense of what would be tolerated by the communities in
which they live every day.'58
6. Punishment to deter. Given the ubiquity of deterrence as an
explicit rationale for punitive damages in contemporary doctrine and
scholarship, it is a little surprising that it does not appear more often
in the nineteenth century cases. It is perhaps for this reason that the
Court in Cooper jumped to the conclusion that punitive damages
compensated pain and suffering in the early cases. Despite the
availability (as described above) of other rationales for awarding
punitive damages other than just compensation for mental distress,
some courts did in fact adopt deterrence as the rationale for punitive
damages. In Maine, for example, both the majority and the dissent in
Goddard v. Grand Trunk Railway of Canada agreed that the purpose
156. 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791).
157. Id. at 78.




of awarding punitive damages was deterrence. 5 9 The majority
thought that this explained why punitive damages should be awarded
against a railway for the intentional torts of its employee: "[w]hen it is
thoroughly understood that it is not profitable to employ careless and
indifferent agents, or reckless and insolent servants, better men will
take their places, and not before."160 New York held the same view:
"[i]t is only in cases of moral wrong, recklessness or malice that this
public consideration applies. In such cases the law uses the suit of a
private party as an instrument of public protection, not for the sake of
the suitor but for that of the public. ' '161
The New York court's rationale was very far from the view that
punitive damages were in any way compensatory. It is also very far
from the view that they were designed to vindicate. It is difficult to
quantify how many courts and commentators actively adopted the
deterrence rationale, but it is clear that it was well established by the
middle of the nineteenth century, and it was quite prevalent by the
beginning of the twentieth century. 162 In any event, its presence in the
New York, Maine, and Rhode Island decisions indicates that it would
be a great mistake to suggest that punitive damages were serving a
primarily compensatory function (of any sort) in the United States in
the nineteenth century.
CONCLUSION
In this Article I demonstrated that punitive damages have never
served the compensatory function attributed to them by the Court in
Cooper. In footnote eleven of the decision the Court relied on a
claim about the history of punitive damages that is at best misleading
and at worst dangerous. While it is true that punitive damages may
have served a compensatory function in the early cases, it is mislead-
ing to describe that function as directed towards the compensation of
the sort of emotional distress which is today captured by categories of
159. 57 Me. 202 (1869).
160. Id. at 224. The dissent agreed with the goal of general deterrence but disagreed with its
application in the case of respondeat superior. Id. at 266. The dissent's view is consistent with
the view of the majority in Hagen v. Providence and Worcester R.R. Co., 3 R.I. 88, 91 (1854),
which held that, because the purpose of exemplary damages was to "teach the lesson of caution
to prevent a repetition of criminality," an employer cannot be held liable in punitive damages
for the actions of a servant.
161. Hamilton v. Third Avenue R.R. Co., 53 N.Y. 25, 30 (1873).
162. According to Rustad and Koenig, "[d]uring the initial decades of the twentieth century,
punitive damages gained an expanded role in consumer protection." Rustad & Koenig, supra
note 75, at 1303.
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compensation for mental suffering associated with shock or IIED. If
punitive damages served a compensatory function, it would have been
for a category of injury that is still not considered compensable by
contemporary tort law, namely the injury of insult that wounds or
dishonors. If these are interests worth protecting-and I believe they
may be-there is nothing to be gained by promoting the misleading
idea that they are protected today by contemporary damages for
emotional distress. Such a claim stretches the doctrine of damages to
the point of breakage.
The only reason to ignore the obvious, and to insist on claiming
that the interest that punitive damages once did and perhaps still
today compensate is "just like" emotional distress, is to provide a
historical basis for the claim that the rationale for punitive damages
has changed in the last 200 years. The Supreme Court's reason for
wanting to believe that the rationale for punitive damages has
changed was that it needed to explain what otherwise would be seen
as a surprising reversal: for over a century courts and commentators
treated punitive damages as if they were properly a matter of factual
judgment only. In Cooper the Court seemed to reverse that state of
affairs and announce that punitive damages require the jury to make
a moral, not a factual, judgment.
On the one hand, since I approve of the Court's procedural con-
clusion- appellate courts should review trial court judgments con-
cerning the constitutionality of juries' punitive damages awards de
novo-it should not matter how the Court defends its holding. But I
would like to suggest that the historical argument it used to reach its
holding is more than misleading, it is dangerous. The implication of
the historical claim presented in footnote eleven is that there have
been two distinct periods of punitive damages: the early, in which
punitive damages served as compensation for emotional distress, and
the later, in which punitive damages shorn of their old function found
a new role in American law by becoming a device for punishment.
It is dangerous for the Court to promote this view not only be-
cause it is false, but because it limits our understanding of what it
might mean for punitive damages to punish and compensate. As
demonstrated in the previous sections, punishment and vindication
were always understood to be two of the primary purposes of punitive
damages. But it is even more important to recognize that the courts
and commentators who defended punitive damages in the nineteenth
century did not see a sharp break between punishment and compen-
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sation in private law. As I suggest above, the "compensation for
insult" rationale and the "personal vindication" rationale are very
closely linked. Juries who were asked to award exemplary damages
in order to vindicate the plaintiff were attempting, in my opinion, to
give satisfaction to victims in order to help construct their commu-
nity's moral norms. Any analysis that tries to draw sharp distinctions
between the private and public functions of punitive damages will end
up mischaracterizing them.
It is no accident, in my opinion, that the Cooper decision pre-
sents only two choices for how to understand punitive damages. In
the Court's eyes the phrase punitive damages is a homonym-a
written expression with two unrelated meanings. On the one hand, to
say that a jury awarded punitive damages in 1850 is to suggest that it
awarded compensation for pain and suffering, while on the other
hand, to say that a jury awarded punitive damages in 1950 is to say
that it punished the defendant in order to deter future wrongdoing.
The first use of the term describes a purely factual, backward-looking
exercise in private redress, while the second describes a purely
normative, forward-looking exercise in public policy. Not only are
both caricatures, but the projection of the first as part of a distant past
legitimates the free use of the second today. Ironically, although the
Court claimed in Cooper that its discovery that punitive damages are
today about morality, not compensation, it is most likely that in doing
so it has promoted a slightly different view. Instead of being about
compensation and "looking backwards," the Court has reinforced the
idea that courts and juries should feel free to use punitive damages as
an instrument of public policy. The public policy that will thus result
from modern courts will not be concerned primarily with individual
rights or even punishment for the sake of retribution. The public
policy guiding the application of punitive damages will be purely
forward-looking and dominated by the theory of efficient deterrence.
I view this as a dangerous development, although certainly those who
think that the only justification for private law is efficiency would
welcome it. But for those who believe that tort law has some justifi-
cation and point other than to serve the end of promoting welfare, the
decision in Cooper is a step in the wrong direction.
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